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Abstract 
This paper compares changes in relative and absolute wealth concentrations to 
establish if both processes have followed similar trajectories. The findings indicate that 
while the level of relative wealth concentration has increased recently, it is not 
extraordinarily high in an historical perspective. On the contrary, the level of absolute 
wealth concentration is most likely higher than that previously occurred because of the 
increase in the wealth holdings and population size of high net worth individuals. The 
sustainability of this on-going absolute concentration of wealth is questionable insofar 
as the resulting pressure of investor demand for safe securities poses a potential threat 
for financial stability. 
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1. Introduction 
Trends in wealth inequality have long been the subject of fierce debate. On the one 
hand, Marx, Engels, and their followers argued that capitalism inevitably leads to 
extreme wealth concentrations, which can trigger the system’s collapse. On the other 
hand, defenders of capitalism such as Porter, Giffen, and Marshall argued that wealth 
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concentration was constant or narrowing but not growing (Lindert, 1986). However, 
neither capitalism’s critics nor defenders have provided substantial evidence for their 
claims. This situation has changed somewhat thanks to the efforts of some economists 
that specialized in the history of inequality, but such discussions usually skirt the issue 
that inequality can be measured in both relative and absolute terms. This distinction is 
important, however, because recent works suggest that growing wealth holdings at the 
top contribute to a situation in which global demand for investible securities outstripped 
their supply. This imbalance was most likely a major driver behind the growth of the 
market for collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), the collapse of which triggered the 
subprime crisis (Lysandrou, 2011; Milanovic, 2011; Goda and Lysandrou, 2013). 
Therefore, the question arises whether the current degree of absolute wealth 
concentration is high in historical terms. 
Relative inequality relates to the possession of wealth shares by specific groups (i.e., 
to the dispersion of wealth holdings between different groups within a population), 
while the concept of absolute wealth concentration in this paper is defined as the 
absolute amount of wealth holdings by one group of individuals, so called high net 
worth individuals (HNWIs).1 Over the last decade, studies have increasingly measured 
and compared the distribution of wealth in relative terms for specific countries (see e.g., 
Ohlsson et al., 2008) or globally (Davies et al., 2010) but, surprisingly, so far no 
academic study has discussed changes in absolute wealth concentrations. The objective 
of this paper is to fill this gap by (i) providing an overview regarding HNWIs’ total 
global wealth holdings and (ii) placing the holdings of the richest HNWIs in an 
historical perspective. Additionally, an overview of existing findings regarding 
historical trends of changes in relative wealth concentrations is provided to establish if 
both factors have displayed similar patterns of change. 
The results of this study indicate that the concentration of relative global wealth 
increased significantly between 2000 and 2012. The main driver behind this increase is 
the rise in wealth inequality within most countries after the mid-1980s. Some causes 
among the possible ones for this rise in inequality are less progressive taxation, deeper 
globalization, and significantly increased top incomes. Apparently, though, the current 
                                                            
1 Absolute inequality can also be measured via indices based on amount additions or subtractions, like the 
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in the absolute amount of wealth holdings at the top and not those at the bottom (note that the creation of 
a long-run absolute wealth index would be very difficult due to data constraints). 
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high extent of relative wealth concentration is not exceptional when placed within an 
historical context. However, the opposite seems to be true for absolute wealth 
concentrations. This second finding can be attributed to the fact that overall global 
wealth has increased in general. Another equally important reason is that HNWIs have 
enjoyed an increase in both population size and wealth holdings in the last ten years 
(especially in developing countries). 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section two provides a brief overview 
regarding the wealth data sources and their shortcomings. Section three summarizes 
existing findings regarding the level and trend of relative wealth concentrations within 
countries and on a global scale, and discusses possible causes for their changes. Section 
four presents different estimates for the HNWIs absolute wealth holdings and 
population size and compares the absolute wealth holdings of today’s richest persons 
with those of the richest person from throughout history in real terms. Section five 
summarizes the main findings of this study. 
 
2. Wealth data sources and their shortcomings 
Wealth inequality is usually measured in the same manner as income inequality. The 
two most widely used concepts to describe wealth inequality levels are the Gini Index 
and the relative concentration of wealth at the top (i.e., top wealth shares). However, in 
contrast to income inequality, only few studies have estimated the extent of within-
country or global wealth inequality. This lack can be attributed to the fact that while 
income data already is relatively sparse and imprecise, the situation is even worse in the 
case of wealth data.  
Data on wealth holdings are retrieved mainly from four sources: household surveys, 
household and financial balance sheets, tax records, and direct wealth estimates for 
named persons. Unfortunately, none of these data sources are free from severe 
shortcomings. Household survey data on wealth, for example, are less reliable than 
income data because wealth is more heavily skewed and thus sampling errors are more 
likely.2 Furthermore, non-response and misreporting – deliberately or due to ignorance 
– are prevalent in households surveys (Guénard and Mesplé-Somps, 2010), and much of 
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not easily accessible) often are underrepresented in surveys (see Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001). 
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the data are top coded (e.g., the US Survey of Consumer Finances excludes the 400 
wealthiest families from its sample). It is therefore well known that surveys most likely 
underestimate the degree of wealth inequality and have a middle-class bias (Davies and 
Shorrocks, 2000, Shaxson et al., 2012). 
Consequently, some researchers (e.g., Davies et al., 2007, 2010) prefer to use 
balance sheet data to measure wealth inequality levels because household balance sheets 
combine survey data with data from residual estimations. Still, they are not totally 
reliable because the residual values are retrieved by subtracting the balance sheet 
holdings of institutional households from total national balance sheet holdings, which 
often are subject to relatively large measurement errors. 
Wealth or estate tax data are therefore often used instead to measure wealth 
inequality. These data have the advantage that their declaration is not voluntary and 
most of the population is covered (only deceased persons in the case of the estate tax). 
However, both sources share the disadvantage that the coverage, definition, and 
valuation of wealth depend on each nation’s tax laws, and that the very rich part of the 
population often (successfully) tries to evade taxes (Palan et al., 2010; Shaxson et al., 
2012). Estate tax data have the further shortcoming that less-wealthy individuals tend to 
die earlier and that the age distribution in the data therefore differs from that in the 
general population (Davies and Shorrocks, 2000). 
Finally, so called ‘rich lists’ – like the Forbes 400 – are often used to measure the 
concentration of wealth at the top-end of the population and adjust wealth inequality 
estimates. However, these data are also problematic as they are derived from publicly-
available information. This means that not necessarily all rich people are covered in 
these lists and that wealth estimates are therefore only based on informed guesses 
(Atkinson, 2008). 
The estimates in the following section are mainly based on household survey data, 
balance sheet data, and estate tax data, while the section on absolute wealth 
concentration also relies on the direct wealth estimates for named persons as these are 
the best available data for HNWIs. Due to the above mentioned shortcomings, the 
presented inequality levels should be treated with caution though and most likely tend to 
be underestimated than overestimated. 
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3. Historical and current levels of relative wealth concentration 
3.1. Historical changes of relative wealth concentration within developed 
countries 
Existing figures suggest that “[w]ealth is distributed less equally than labour income, 
total money income or consumption expenditure. While Gini coefficients in developed 
countries typically range between about 0.3 and 0.4 for income, they vary from about 
0.5 to 0.9 for wealth. Other indicators reveal a similar picture. The estimated share of 
wealth held by the top 1 percent of individuals or families varies from about 15-35 
percent, for example, whereas their income share is usually less than 10 percent.” 
(Davies and Shorrocks, 2000, p.607). 
Such high levels of wealth inequality are not a new phenomenon. The Gini 
coefficient for asset holdings in the US was, for example, 0.64 in 1774 and rose to 0.83 
in 1870 (Williamson and Lindert, 1980). This rise in wealth inequality reflects the fact 
that the richest individuals could more than double their wealth share during this period. 
In 1774, the top 1% held around 13% of all assets, increasing to around 27% in 1870. 
The wealth holdings of the top 10% also increased from around 50% in the 
revolutionary period to around 70% in 1860 (Martin, 1971), and the existing data 
suggest that in 1890, the top 9% of the population held around 71% of all wealth, while 
the top 0.03% held an astonishing 20% (Bouroff, 1900). These figures indicate that the 
richest segment of the US population gained most from the 9-fold increase in total 
wealth between 1850 (US$ 7.2 billion) and 1890 (US$ 65 billion). 
The same is true for the period between 1890 and 1929, in which the share held by 
the top 1% of total US wealth holdings increased from 26% to 44% (Ohlsson et al., 
2008). The historical trends of relative wealth concentrations in the UK and in France 
are similar to the US, but their levels were much higher. In 1740, the top 1% of UK 
households held around 44% of all wealth; this figure increased to 61% in 1875 and to a 
staggering 69% before the start of World War One (Lindert, 1986). The estimates for 
France suggest that the top 1% held around 43% of all wealth at the beginning of the 
19th century, a figure that increased to around 55% by 1913 (Piketty et al., 2006). 
If one compares the share of the top 5% of wealth holders from 1850 with that from 
World War One, it becomes obvious that wealth inequality does not automatically rise 
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Shorrock, 2000).3 One can argue that the willingness to amass wealth can be explained 
by the fact that capitalists accumulate wealth for the sake of wealth itself (Francis, 
2009) or as a status symbol (Corneo and Jeanne, 2001). Nevertheless, these arguments 
do not convincingly explain why it is possible that a tiny minority of individuals can 
become more than 500,000 times wealthier than the median individual.4 Many 
alternative explanations that attempt to explain such substantial differences are based on 
exploitation, monopoly rents, asymmetric information, and lobbying power (see e.g. 
Irving, 1896; Bouroff, 1900; Call, 1907; Stiglitz, 2012). Another explanation for this 
phenomenon could be sheer luck coupled with the outcome of a kind of natural physical 
law5: over time, the majority of existing wealth becomes automatically concentrated in 
the hands of fewer individuals because, after having gained some initial level of wealth, 
those individuals are able to exchange and invest more money and thus amass more and 
more wealth over time (see e.g., Bouchaud and Mézard, 2000; Buchanan, 2002; Levy 
and Levy, 2003; Yakovenko and Rosser, 2009).  
While certainly more research is needed on this topic, all non-standard arguments 
mentioned above might help explain why relative wealth concentration decreased so 
sharply during the middle of the 20th century. According to Bouchaud and Mézard’s 
(2000) model, high progressive taxes coupled with redistribution exert a dampening 
effect on wealth concentration in capitalist societies. This finding is in line with Ohlsson 
et al.’s (2008) observation that, next to the Great Depression and the two World Wars, 
rising taxation for top income earners and redistribution are important determinants in 
explaining the sharp decline of wealth concentration in industrialized countries during 
large parts of the 20th century. 
                                                            
3 Standard theory assumes that people engage in savings behavior to ensure constant consumption over 
their lifetime. Arguably, a billionaire is neither saving to be able to keep his current consumption level 
after retirement nor to ensure that his children have a decent life style. Furthermore, Jappelli’s (1999) 
research suggests that very rich households, in contrast to poor and middle-class households, do not 
significantly de-cumulate wealth in old age. 
4 The median wealth in Germany in 2007 was around 20,000 Euro (Frick and Grabka, 2009), for example. 
According to the Forbes Rich List, in 2007 the third richest German individual, Michael Otto, owned net 
assets with a worth of around 10 billion Euros, which was 500,000 times the median wealth. 
5 The idea that the distribution of wealth follows a universal natural law was first proposed by Vilfredo 
Pareto at the beginning of the 20th century. Pareto found not only that there exist “many individuals at the 
lowest end of the scale and fewer and fewer as you progress along the graph toward higher levels of 
wealth [but also] that they dwindled in a very special way toward the wealthy end of the curve: Each time 
you double the amount of wealth, the number of people falls by a constant factor. The factor varies from 
country to country, but the pattern remains essentially the same.” (Buchanan, 2002, p.4). 
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Other possible reasons for this decrease of relative wealth concentration were 
stronger competition laws, better labor protection, and near full-employment. These 
heterodox approaches might also partly explain the rising concentration that emerged 
after 1980. From 1981 onwards, taxation in many developed countries became less 
progressive,6 privatization and the emergence of global oligopolies and monopolies led 
to an increase in monopoly rents (e.g., in the IT sector), while the weakening of labor 
standards and an increase in unemployment reduced workers’ bargaining power 
(Stiglitz, 2012). These phenomena probably are related to some extent to the increasing 
lobbying power of the wealthy (Haseler, 2000; Esteban and Ray, 2006; Wisman, 2013). 
Additionally, the substantial increase of global stock market and real estate prices, 
the deepening of globalization, and the significant increase in top incomes might also 
have contributed to the trend change. It is well documented that financial assets and 
non-home real estate are highly skewed towards the rich (see e.g., Wolff, 2010), and 
recent results by Torgler and Piatti (2013) “indicate that globalization enhances super-
richness” (p.357). Finally, Atkinson et al. (2011) show that the total income share of the 
top 1% was increasing after 1985 in all developing countries for which data are 
available (with the exception of the Netherlands and Switzerland). This point is 
especially important because increasing top income flows and top wealth holdings are 
mutually reinforcing. On the one hand, high income households have a higher 
propensity to save due to the fact that individuals have natural limits to consumption 
(for billionaires it is nearly impossible to spend most of their income on personal 
consumption). On the other hand, “wealth has a substantial impact on the share of 
income earned by those in the top 0.5 percent of the [adjusted gross income] 
distribution” (Tuttle and Gauger, 2006, pg. 506). 
Therefore, one might even consider why reported wealth concentration levels have 
not grown to even higher levels in recent years. One reason is that prior to the crisis, the 
bottom 90% also saw considerable increases in wealth due to the stock market and 
housing bubbles. Another, probably more important, reason might be that much of the 
increased wealth concentration is not recorded in household surveys and tax statistics 
because of top-coding, sampling errors, nonresponses, misreporting, tax avoidance, and 
                                                            
6 The average OECD central government top marginal wage income tax rate decreased by 22%-points 
between 1981 and 2007 (from 58% to 36%) and the average OECD net top statutory rate on dividend 
income decreased by 26%-points (from 57% to 21%) according to the OECD tax database (2012). 
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tax evasion. Reportedly, many rich households shift their funds to tax havens to avoid 
tax payments – estimates suggest that rich individuals are hiding between US$ 12 
trillion (Palan et al., 2010) and US$ 21 trillion (Henry, 2012) offshore. 
 
3.2. Current extent of relative wealth inequality on a global scale 
Recently, some studies have attempted to estimate current levels of wealth inequality 
between world citizens. All such studies are based on a very similar methodology, but 
estimate global wealth inequality levels for different years. Davies et al. (2010) studied 
the level of global inequality for the year 2000. They retrieved existing wealth level data 
from financial and non-financial balance sheet data for 39 countries covering around 
61% of the world’s population. To include the missing 39% of the world’s population 
(190 countries), the wealth per adult was estimated via regressions (34% of the world’s 
population) and region and income class imputations (5% of the world population). 
These results suggest that in 2000, the wealth inequality level between countries was 
around 60 Gini points. This level of inequality is nearly the same as that for income 
inequality between countries (see Milanovic, 2012). 
In their second step, the authors estimated and imputed the wealth distributions 
within countries in order to measure global wealth inequality. For 20 countries, wealth 
distributions can be constructed from household survey data and tax records. However, 
in addition to their different sources, these data also have different units of analysis 
(household, family, and adult) and for some countries only decile shares are available. 
Thus, Davies et al. used a program to construct “a synthetic sample of 1,000 
observations that conforms exactly with any valid set of quantile shares derived from a 
distribution of positive values” for these countries (2010, p.241). The same program 
was applied on an adjusted WIID income distribution dataset7 to estimate the wealth 
distribution for an additional 124 countries. Finally, for 85 countries for whom 
insufficient information was available, the wealth distribution was imputed according to 
region and income classes. 
The resulting estimates suggest that the global wealth Gini coefficient in the year 
2000 was around 89 if official exchange rates are used (Table 1, first column), and 
                                                            
7 Please note that the authors took into account the fact that wealth is less evenly distributed than income 
by multiplying the income figures with a constant ratio. 
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around 80 if the data are adjusted for purchasing power parity. The latter figure is 
around 10 Gini points higher than that of the global PPP income Gini coefficient, which 
was around 70 in 2000 (see Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin, 2009; Milanovic 2012). 
Davies et al. (2010) furthermore conclude that the top decile owned 71% of total global 
wealth if the data are adjusted for purchasing power parity. Again, this figure is 
significantly lower than in the case of income inequality, where the top 10% receive less 
than 60% of global income (see Milanovic, 2012). 
Table 1: Global wealth distribution 2000 - 2012 
 
Note: This table reports changes in wealth inequality within countries (via Gini coefficients) and changes 
in the mean wealth for selected populous countries and the world as a whole. The two bottom rows report 
the share of total global wealth held by the richest 1% and richest 10% of the population. All figures are 
based on official exchange rates. The last two columns report the change between 2000 and 2012 
(sources: Davies et al., 2007, 2010; CS 2010, 2011, 2012; own calculations) 
To estimate the level of global wealth inequality for the years 2010 - 2012, Credit 
Suisse (CS, 2010, 2011, 2012) has used very similar techniques to those described 
above. The most important difference between Davies et al.’s and CS’s methodology is 
that the latter’s study extrapolated the upper wealth tail according to a Pareto 
distribution.8 CS’s results suggest that the mean wealth per adult increased by 60% 
                                                            
8 “[T]he number of billionaires reported by Forbes was used to fit a Pareto distribution to the upper tail of 
each of the 59 countries listed as having one or more billionaires. The top wealth values in the synthetic 
sample were then replaced by the new estimates, and the resulting sample for each country was re-scaled 
Gini 
coefficient
Mean 
wealth per 
adult (US$)
Gini 
coefficient
Mean 
wealth per 
adult (US$)
Gini 
coefficient
Mean 
wealth per 
adult (US$)
Gini 
coefficient
Mean 
wealth per 
adult (US$)
Δ Gini 
coefficient
Δ Wealth per 
adult (ratio 
2012 to 2000)
Argentina 74.0 24,753         74.7 17,316         76.8 21,641 78.2 17,629   4.2 0.71
Brazil 78.4 8,300           79.6 25,270         79.5 34,439 81.2 24,600   2.8 2.96
Canada 68.8 108,464      68.3 225,896      72.3 245,455 72.8 227,660   4.0 2.10
China 55.0 5,672           69.0 17,126         69.7 20,711 68.9 20,452 13.9 3.61
France 73.0 103,619      75.8 255,156      75.4 293,685 75.5 265,463   2.5 2.56
Germany 66.7 89,770         68.4 164,561      75.0 199,783 77.7 174,526 11.0 1.94
India 66.9 2,036           77.8 4,910           80.4 5,548 81.3 4,250 14.4 2.09
Indonesia 76.4 2,502           77.3 12,112         81.2 12,109 82.0 10,842   5.6 4.33
Italy 60.9 119,773      62.6 226,423      61.3 259,826 64.6 212,910   3.7 1.78
Japan 54.7 191,877      60.7 201,387      60.1 248,770 59.6 269,708   4.9 1.41
Korea 57.9 32,969         60.7 70,751         68.0 76,621 72.6 69,646 14.7 2.11
Mexico 74.9 17,484         78.0 25,399         77.4 36,467 78.0 29,870   3.1 1.71
Pakistan 69.8 2,347           65.6 4,646           65.0 5,094 63.9 4,139 ‐5.9 1.76
Russia 69.9 1,708           70.6 10,408         91.6 10,911 91.4 12,161 21.5 7.12
Thailand 71.0 2,527           70.1 5,143           76.8 7,351 79.0 7,415   8.0 2.93
UK 69.7 162,999      71.7 229,940      67.0 257,881 67.5 250,005 ‐2.2 1.53
US 80.1 192,399      80.9 236,213      82.4 248,395 85.2 262,351   5.1 1.36
Vietnam 68.2 1,701           68.2 4,606           67.5 4,535 65.9 4,652 ‐2.3 2.73
World 89.2 30,669         88.1 43,784         89.3 51,078 90.2 48,501   1.0 1.6
Global top 10% share
Global top 1% share
85.6%
45.8%
Change 2000 ‐ 2012
+0.4%‐points
+5.7%‐points
2000 2010 2011 2012
85.2%
40.1%
82.8%
43.6%
84.3%
44.2%
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between 2000 and 2012,9 and that out of the most populous countries, only Argentina’s 
adults experienced a wealth decrease during that period. It is furthermore interesting to 
note that the per capita wealth gap between richer and poorer countries has narrowed – 
countries like Japan, the US, and the UK increased their mean wealth per adult by a 
lower ratio than poor populous countries like Russia, Indonesia, China, Brazil, and India 
(Table 1, last column). 
Inequality within the vast majority of populous countries, on the contrary, has 
increased over the same time frame; to be more precise, only Pakistan, Vietnam, and the 
UK have a lower Gini coefficient in 2012 than in 2000 (Table 1, second last column). 
This global increase in intra-country inequality explains the finding that the Gini 
coefficient in 2012 (90.2) was slightly higher than in 2000 (89.2), and explains also why 
the top 1% of world citizens could increase their share of global wealth by nearly 6%-
points (Table 1, last row). 
It can therefore be concluded that, while both studies find “very large inter-country 
differences in the level of household wealth ..., the principal reason for the high global 
inequality of wealth [is the] high inequality of wealth within countries” (Davies et al., 
2010, p.224) in general, and specifically, the high concentration of wealth at the top (in 
2012, the top 1% of the global population held nearly 46% of global assets). It is 
important to keep in mind that the slight change in the methodology between 2000 and 
2010 means that the figures are not one hundred percent comparable. Nevertheless, a 
trend of increasing global wealth concentration is evident. However, the relative 
concentration of wealth at the top was probably not exceptionally high compared to 
historical levels, at least when compared to the concentration of wealth in Western 
countries (as shown in Figure 1). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
to match the mean wealth value. This sequence was repeated until the process converged, typically after a 
few rounds” (CS, 2012, pg. 9). 
9 The changes in intra-country wealth levels depend on the changes in asset prices and exchange rates. 
The US Dollar appreciation of 2012, for example, is partly responsible for the decrease of the mean 
wealth per adult in some countries listed in Table 1. 
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4. High net worth individuals and absolute wealth concentration 
4.1. High net worth individuals: What do we know? 
The increase in relative wealth concentrations implies that absolute global wealth 
concentrations also increased recently. Unfortunately, “[o]fficial publications do not 
report estimates of absolute inequality, and even academic studies are rare” in the case 
of income (Atkinson and Brandolini, 2010, p.3) and non-existent in the case of wealth. 
To help close this gap, this section will provide an overview regarding recent changes in 
HNWIs’ global wealth holdings, with the aim of giving a rough indication of today’s 
levels of absolute wealth holdings at the top. Large parts of this analysis are based on 
data from publicly available private wealth reports – the three best known wealth 
reports are published yearly by Capgemini and Merrill Lynch (CML), the Boston 
Consulting Group (BCG), and CS. 
There is a general consensus that HNWIs are rich individuals or households that have 
a net worth of at least one million US dollars. However, disagreement does exist over 
which asset classes should be included or excluded when calculating net worth: The 
World Wealth Reports from CML employ a definition that includes all equities, fixed 
income securities, cash and deposit holdings, real estate holdings (excluding primary 
residences), and alternative forms of investment by individuals, while consumables and 
consumer durables and collectibles are excluded. BCG’s Global Wealth Reports are less 
inclusive, estimating household net wealth on the basis of “cash deposits, money market 
funds, listed securities … and onshore and offshore assets [while] wealth attributed to 
investor’s own businesses, residences, or luxury goods” are excluded (2008, p.7). The 
estimates of the Global Wealth Reports from CS, on the contrary, are based on the most 
inclusive definition, which essentially comprises all individual wealth holdings 
considered in household balance sheets and household survey data. 
Unfortunately, no precise information exists concerning the actual wealth holdings of 
HNWIs because “survey data from which … wealth distribution estimates are derived 
tend to under-represent the wealthiest groups and to entirely omit ultra high net worth 
individuals” (CS, 2010, p.9). Sometimes, such omissions are explicit (as discussed in 
Section 2). However, such omissions also reflect the reality that existing global 
governance arrangements allow HNWIs to be highly mobile and secretive, which means 
they store large proportions of their wealth in tax havens without reporting these 
amounts (Palan et al., 2010; Shaxson et al., 2012). All reported wealth figures 
13 
concerning HNWIs are therefore rough estimates that rely on different estimation 
techniques. 
The estimates from CS are based on the methodology described above, also taking 
into account the observation that the existing “data indicate a good fit with a Pareto 
distribution for wealth levels above USD 250,000” (2010, p.9); this Pareto distribution 
is used to extrapolate wealth holdings for the top wealth tail across 216 countries. 
CML’s estimates cover 71 countries (98% of global GDP) and are based on a two-step 
approach similar to CS’s method: “wealth levels by country are estimated using national 
account statistics [that] are adjusted based on world stock indexes”, and the wealth 
distribution within countries is “based on formulized relationships between wealth and 
income” (2008, p.34). The BCG wealth report is less clear about its methodology and 
only somewhat vaguely describes wealth estimates as based on “a comprehensive 
market study of wealth, which covered 62 countries representing more than 96 of global 
GDP, and an equally comprehensive benchmarking survey of 111 wealth managers, 
who oversaw a total of $ 9.9 trillion in client assets and liabilities” (2007, p.6). 
The rough estimates of these three wealth reports suggest that in 2012, the global 
population size of HNWIs was between 12 and 28.5 million individuals (Table 2, lower 
section), whose global assets had a net worth of between US$ 46.2 and US$ 87.5 
trillion, (Table 2, upper section). The CS estimates are naturally the highest among the 
three studies as primary residences, consumables and collectibles are included. BCG, on 
the contrary, excludes all real estate holdings, which most likely explains why its wealth 
estimates between 2001 and 2008 are lower than the CML estimates. When real estate 
wealth is added to BCG’s estimates (i.e., if one adds the estimated real estate wealth of 
HNWIs, as reported by CML, to the BCG estimates) then BCG provides constantly 
higher estimates than CML from 2003 onwards. Thus, the CML estimates can be seen 
as a kind of lower boundary estimate of HNWIs’ wealth holdings when a definition is 
used that includes real estate but excludes primary residences. 
All of these estimates suggest that HNWIs are the biggest global investor group. In 
2012, they had more assets under management than global pension funds (US$ 33.9 
trillion), insurance companies (US$ 26.5 trillion), mutual funds (US$ 26.1 trillion), and 
sovereign wealth funds (US$ 5.2 trillion) (Maslakovic, 2013). Table 2 shows 
furthermore that HNWIs saw their total wealth holdings increase substantially between 
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1997 and 2012, and that the recent economic crisis only affected HNWIs negatively in 
2008. To be more precise, CML claims that HNWIs’ wealth holdings increased 2.4-fold 
between 1997 and 2012,10 while BCG reports a 2.6-fold increase between 2001 and 
2012. To put these figures in perspective: between 2001 and 2012, global GDP and total 
household wealth increased only 2.2-fold and 2.1-fold respectively,11 with the result that 
the estimated share of HNWIs’ wealth holdings to total global wealth increased from 
around 32% in 2001 to around 40% in 2012 (Table 2, middle rows).  
Table 2: HNWIs’ net wealth and population size 
 
Note: The upper section of the table compares different estimates of the HNWIs total net worth for 
different years. The middle section shows the estimated share of HNWIs wealth on total global wealth. 
The lower section demonstrates the estimated changes in the HNWI population. Boston Consulting 
Group’s (BCG) estimates are household figures and only include financial wealth; Capgemini and 
Merrill Lynch’s (CML) estimates exclude primary residences, consumables, and collectibles and are 
based on individual wealth; Credit Suisse’s (CS) estimates comprise all individual wealth holdings 
(sources: BCG Global Wealth Reports; CML World Wealth Reports; CS Global Wealth Reports). 
The distribution of millionaires and their wealth is very unevenly distributed across 
the globe. CS (2012) estimate that more than 40% of the high net worth population lives 
in North America, while around 30% and 25% are domiciled in Europe and Asia-
Pacific. In contrast, CML’s (2013) estimates are significantly lower for North America 
and much higher for the Asia-Pacific region (Figurer 2a). Both reports agree, however, 
that more than 90% of HNWIs population lives in Northern America, Europe, and the 
Asia-Pacific region. 
                                                            
10 Between 1986 and 2012 HNWI wealth increased even 6.6-fold according to CML’s data – from 
US$ 7.2 trillion to US$ 46.2 trillion. During the same period global GDP only increased 4.8-fold in 
current terms – from US$ 14.8 to 71.7 trillion (WDI, 2013) 
11 World GDP increased from US$ 32.2 to US$ 71.7 trillion in current terms (WDI, 2013) during this 
time, while total household wealth increased from US$ 64.9 to US$ 135.5 trillion according to BCG 
estimates. 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
BCG estimates 20.5 20.0 25.1 28.6 29.3 34.5 38.7 32.4 41.9 47.7 49.1 54.0
CML estimates 19.1 21.6 25.5 25.5 26.2 26.7 28.5 30.7 33.3 37.2 40.7 32.8 39.0 42.7 42.0 46.2
CS estimates 69.2 89.1 87.5
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
BCG estimates 31.6 30.3 31.9 32.9 33.3 34.6 35.3 31.7 37.1 38.9 39.8 39.8
CS estimates 35.6 38.5 39.3
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
BCG estimates 6.1 5.8 9.6 10.7 9.0 11.2 12.5 12.6 13.8
CML estimates 5.2 5.9 7.0 6.9 7.1 7.3 7.7 8.2 8.7 9.5 10.1 8.6 10.0 10.9 11.0 12.0
CS estimates 24.2 29.6 28.5
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the same US$ 30 million threshold, estimates that the global ultra-HNWIs population 
totaled around 187,000, with a combined net worth of US$ 25.8 trillion. This sizeable 
difference is surprising as the exclusion (CML) or inclusion (Wealth-X) of primary 
residencies and consumables should not have a major impact on estimates of ultra-
HNWIs’ net wealth. 
The financial crisis of 2008 seemingly affected ultra-HNWIs slightly more than 
ordinary HNWIs. According to CML’s estimates, HNWIs lost 19% of their wealth in 
2008 whereas ultra-HNWIs lost 24% (their net worth in 2007 was US$ 15 trillion and 
declined to US$ 11.4 trillion in 2008). In terms of population size, the difference was 
even more pronounced, as the HNWI population shrank by 15% while the number of 
ultra-HNWIs declined by nearly 25%. Apparently, the richest of the rich lost even more 
during the crisis. According to Forbes’ (2013) estimates, the billionaires population 
shrank by 30% and their net wealth declined by 45% as a result of the crisis. 
However, already in 2011, ultra-HNWIs and billionaires had more than recovered 
their crisis losses, so that the combined net wealth of billionaires in 2013 was US$ 5.3 
trillion and their global population size was 1,352 (around 60% of whom reside in the 
US and Europe). This recovery means that billionaires’ global net wealth continues to 
grow exponentially (Figure 3a).13 Finally, it is interesting to note that between 2000 and 
2012, the mean net wealth per billionaire apparently was rising faster than that of 
‘ordinary’ global adults (Figure 3b). The mean net wealth per billionaire increased 1.9-
fold during this period, while the mean net wealth per adult was only 1.6-times higher in 
2012 than in 2000 (according to the estimates provided in Section 3.2). This comparison 
suggests also that, on average, ‘ordinary’ global adults suffered more from the crisis 
than persons having a net wealth above US$ one billion.14 
  
                                                            
13 Forbes numbers might underestimate the wealth and population size of billionaires. Wealth-X (2013) 
estimates suggest that 2,160 billionaires had a combined net wealth of US$ 6.2 trillion in 2012. 
14 It is difficult to compare all individuals between the lists due to name changes and deaths (the average 
billionaire age in 2007 was 62 years). Nevertheless, only three individuals/families that were among the 
top 100 billionaires in 2007 were not included in the Forbes’ billionaires list of 2013. In other words, 
those individuals/families that are very rich tend to stay rich even during a strong economic crisis. This 
finding is in line with Saez’s (2013) study reporting that in the US, “the top 1% captured 95% of the 
income gains in the first three years of the recovery”. 
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While this relative concept is interesting and innovative, it does, however, say 
nothing about the extent of today’s absolute wealth concentration in comparison with 
that enjoyed by historical figures. To develop an idea regarding these differences, it is 
possible to determine the identity of the richest man in absolute terms by comparing the 
inflation-adjusted peak wealth of the above mentioned persons with the wealth holdings 
of today’s richest billionaires. This method, unfortunately, is not applicable for the 
richest Romans but does enable a comparison of the absolute wealth holdings of the 
above-determined richest person of all time in relative terms – Rockefeller – with the 
absolute wealth holdings of today’s richest billionaires. The result of this calculation 
suggests that Rockefeller’s US$ 1.4 billion in 1937 is equivalent to around US$ 22 
billion in 2012,15 and reveals the astonishing fact that his peak wealth would not have 
placed him even within the top 20 global billionaires (according to Bloomberg’s and 
Forbes billionaires list, one would need to have a net worth of at least US$ 23 billion to 
be among the top 20 at the end of 2012). Furthermore, it is interesting to note that at the 
end of 2012, each of the four richest men on earth – Slim, Gates, Ortega, and Buffet – 
were more than twice as rich, with the richest three times as rich as Rockefeller 
(Bloomberg, 2013). 
Given these surprising results, one might argue that the US$ 1.4 billion estimate of 
Rockefeller’s 1937 fortune is too conservative. Call (1907), for example, claims that 
Rockefeller’s wealth at the beginning of the 20th century was at least US$ 2.5 billion. 
This claim rests on rather shaky foundations though.16 Nevertheless, if one assumes, for 
the sake of argument, that Rockefeller’s net wealth peaked earlier and was around US$ 
2.5 billion in 1914, his inflation-adjusted wealth would still be lower than today’s 
wealth holdings of either Slim or Gates.17 This finding is especially remarkable when 
considering that in Rockefeller’s time, few countries had very rich citizens, while 
nowadays Asian-Pacific, Latin American, and African countries host more than one 
fourth of the HNWIs population, nearly 40% of the billionaire population, and more 
than 45% of HNWIs net wealth (Figure 2). In other words, it is most likely that today 
                                                            
15 Please note that the 1973 wealth was adjusted with the historic yearly CPI inflation rates readily 
available from the US Bureau of Labor. 
16 This claim is based on an article of a New York tabloid that states that Rockefeller’s yearly income in 
1905 was at least US$ 72 million. The New York Times in its Obituary from 1937 states however that, 
according to tax records, Rockefeller’s net wealth was not more than US$ 800 million in 1918. 
17 Rockefeller’s wealth in 2012 figures would be around US$ 60 billion, while Carlos Slim and Bill Gates 
had a net worth of around US$ 75 and US$ 63 billion, respectively. 
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the extent of absolute wealth holdings at the top is higher than ever before in human 
history. 
This finding is important insofar as several researchers claim that the pressure of 
investor demand for safe securities was a main reason for the tremendous growth of the 
CDO market and the rise of shadow banking system prior to 2007 (Gros, 2009; 
Caballero, 2009; 2010; Bernanke, 2011; Pozsar, 2011; Lysandrou and Nesvetailova, 
forthcoming). According to recent estimates, one very important driver behind this 
demand were HNWIs who (i) helped to lower the yield of highly rated traditional bond 
classes, which put pressure on investors to seek alternative securities able to provide 
higher yields, and (ii) were the main investors in hedge funds, which, in turn, were the 
main buyers of CDOs (Goda and Lysandrou, 2013). The historically-high concentration 
of wealth at the top therefore poses a potential threat to the stability of the global 
economic system, as can be seen from the recent resurgence of the ‘search for yield’ 
phenomena (Fleming and Jenkins, 2013; Skypala, 2013, Tett, 2013). 
The major policy implication that emerges from this analysis is that either the supply 
of safe investible securities ought to increase or the concentration of wealth ought to 
decrease to prevent the financial system from endogenously overexposing itself to 
systemic risk as occurred prior to the subprime crisis. The current aim to reduce 
government debt levels in developed countries is therefore counter-productive with 
regard to overall global financial stability. If big countries (like the US, the UK, 
Germany, France, and Japan) reduce their debt levels, even less investible securities will 
be available, which would increase the pressure to create other (more risky) assets to 
satisfy existing investor demand. However, it is questionable if a further increase in 
government debt is sufficient to accommodate rising demand for investible securities. 
Therefore, private sector wealth needs to become more evenly distributed to decrease 
pressure to create suitable ‘wealth containers’ for the vast amounts of accumulated 
wealth that exist today. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The figures discussed in this paper indicate that today global wealth inequality is 
very high (more than 90 Gini points), and that the richest 1% own nearly half of all 
global wealth. The reasons are that the mean wealth figures between countries are very 
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different (although the gap is decreasing) and, more importantly, the distribution of 
wealth within countries has become increasingly unequal since the 1980s. Having said 
this, the existing data suggest that relative intra-country wealth inequalities in developed 
countries are not extraordinary high in a historical perspective (in many Western 
countries, relative wealth concentration peaked early in the 20th century). 
The level of absolute wealth concentration at the top, in contrast, is most likely 
higher than previously in history because (i) global wealth has increased in general, (ii) 
the global population of high net worth individuals has increased significantly, and (ii) 
the richest among those individuals are much richer than their counterparts at the 
beginning of the 20th century (i.e., their inflation-adjusted net worth is much higher). 
The presented data furthermore suggest that today’s rich individuals recovered very 
quickly from the severe losses incurred during the financial crisis. This was especially 
true for billionaires, who already recovered fully from their losses by 2011, meaning 
that their net wealth holdings increased exponentially between 1987 and 2013. This 
situation has arisen because top incomes are increasing faster than those of the 
population in general, global asset prices continue to rise, taxation has become less 
progressive, much of their wealth is stored offshore, and the world has become more 
globalized. 
In addition to ethical issues, this on-going concentration of wealth in the hands of a 
tiny minority is questionable insofar as the resulting increased demand for investible 
securities contributes to a safe asset imbalance that poses a threat to the stability of the 
global economic system. The presented results have to be treated with caution though, 
given that only few studies exist and that their estimates have severe shortcomings, 
mainly due to the woeful quality of the existing data. Therefore, a need exists not only 
to intensify research regarding changes in wealth distribution and its economic effects, 
but as well the need to improve the availability and quality of data. 
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